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SYMPOSIUM
PHYSICIAN DECISION MAKING
AND MANAGED CARE
INTRODUCTION
ISSUE OF HEALTH MATRIX contains seven articles
that were presented as part of a workshop on June 8-9, 1995,
on physician decision-making in managed care settings. The
workshop was sponsored by the American Medical Association,
the P.I.E. Mutual Insurance Company, and the Ohio State Medical Association. Drafts of these papers were presented at the
workshop and were refined for publication following the discussion. Discussants included John Blum, Randall Bovbjerg, Harry
Brown, Ruth Anna Carlson, Carl Gillombardo, Dan Klais, David
Kern, Frank Lettierri, Rosemary Macedonio, Thomas Murray,
Rand Rosenblatt, Mark Rust, Simonetti Samuels, Dinah Siever,
Andrew Smith, Stephanie Switzer, Norman Tazlitz, Charles Weller, Sidney Wolfe, and Walter Zelman.
In preparing their remarks, each of the authors was asked to
respond to a specific aspect of the following thesis statement:
Market forces are rapidly transforming the traditional roles
of physicians and patients. Historically, patients and physicians
had control over the medical care that was provided to patients.
The physician recommended the course of treatment that the
physician believed was in the best interests of the patient, and
the patient decided whether to accept the recommendation.
Tort law buttressed this relationship by requiring the physician to meet minimum standards of knowledge and skill, and by
requiring that the patient give informed consent prior to receiving medical care. The law generally did not take into account a
societal need to expend resources wisely in determining whether
the physician met the standard of care. The traditional health insurance indemnity plan accommodated these roles by paying for
any care recommended by a physician and received by the patient, provided it was within the scope of coverage of the plan.
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Due to a need to control costs, payors have begun to insist
that physicians comply with payor-endorsed controls, protocols,
and standards before they will pay for medical care received by
one of their beneficiaries. A new element has been introduced
into the decision-making process - whether the course of treatment recommended by the physician is the most cost-effective
medical option available.
These changes have thrown the law into confusion. On the
one hand, the law seems willing to accept the control lost by the
patient as a choice made as a matter of contract with the payor.
On the other hand, the law continues to insist that the physician
continue to meet the traditional, patient-centered standard of care.
Some courts have resisted efforts by patients and physicians to
shift tort responsibility for medical decision-making to the health
plans. Other courts have not. The physician has been asked to
find the appropriate balance between cost control and the needs
of the patient. Yet antitrust and other laws have facilitated the
ability of health plans to obtain economic leverage over physicians, making it difficult for physicians to challenge the controls
exerted by health plans over medical decision-making.
These issues have not raised serious patient care problems
to date because traditional medical practice built in large margins
of safety for the care of patients, and also facilitated a substantial
amount of waste. As a result, it has been possible to reduce costs
by reducing the size of the margins of safety and by eliminating
waste.
What will happen when the ability of physicians to reduce
costs in this fashion reaches its limit? Will they have the leverage necessary to resist pressures to achieve further savings by
degrading the quality of patient outcomes? What legal controls
should be put in place that will enable physicians to draw the
line?
As the Director of the Law-Medicine Center, I want to
thank all of those whose efforts and generosity made this workshop possible.
Maxwell J. Mehlman*

* Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center.

